INTRODUCTION
A group of students apply for a scholarship. A ranking of students must be provided. The social objective is to assign the most prestigious scholarship to the best student, the second most prestigious scholarship to the second best student, and so on. We assume that each student has a different adviser and that there is one scholarship per student, so that the number of applicants, advisers, and scholarships is the same. The ranking of students will be provided by a jury composed of all advisers. There is a true ranking of students, which is known by all advisers. The preferences of advisers are inftuenced by the true ranking. 2 We want to design pro ce dures under which thc true ranking is obtained, even when advisers behave strategically to favor their most preferred students. 3 This is precisely the aim of implementation theory, which we can describe briefty as follows. There is a set of alternativcs and a space of preferences defined on these alternatives. The planner wants to implement a social choice rule mapping preferences into alternatives. To do so, he sets up a mechanism, Le., a list of message spaces (one for each agent) and an outcome function mapping messages into alternatives. In this paper we focus on a specific implementation problem with the following characteristics:
1. The set of alternatives is the set of possible rankings (permutations) of a given set of agents. Each ranking is interpreted as an assignment of scholarships.
11. The social choice rule is such that, given a true ranking, it yields this ranking as the outcome. We call this rule the socially optimal choice function (SOCF).
III. The true ranking is observed perfectly by all deciders. The set of deciders is identical to the set of agents. This may be interpreted as saying that each agent has a decider who is on his side.
IV. Preferences are such that the following two conditions are met: (1) Each professor wants a particular student to get the most prestigious scholarship, and (2) each professor wants the remaining scholarships to be assigned according to the true ranking. We call these preferences "moderately selfish." We feel that these preferences may be a reasonable approx20ther situations with a similar structure include rankings of Ph.D. programs, wine tasting, gymnastic competitions, and choosing fellows for a society.
3 Most procedures used in real life are designed to avoid blatant manipulation; i.e., the higher and lower scores received by any agent do not count, people cannot vote for themselves, and so on.
imation of situations in which professors judge the performance of other students unbiasedly.
Despite the enormous literature generated by implementation theory in the last three decades, little attention has been paid to the particular problem described aboye (see Sect. 5 for a discussion of this point).
It is easy to show that with two agents, the SOCF cannot be implemented in any equilibrium concept when preferences are moderately selfish. Thus, we study implementation of the SOCF in the case of three or more agents.
We first focus our attention on implementation in dominant strategies. Since preference profiles do not have a Cartesian product structure, the standard revelation principie cannot be applied to our problem. Moreover, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) is of no direct application here, since the domain of admissible preferences is restricted to moderately selfish preferences. 4 Unfortunately, this restriction is not powerful enough to bring positive results: If there are three agents, then the SOCF cannot be implemented in dominant strategies (Theorem 1).
Next, we consider Nash implementation. We first notice that the SOCF can be implemented by the "canonical" Maskin mechanism as described by Williams (1984) , Repullo (1987) , Saijo (1988), and McKelvey (1989) . This follows from the fact that the SOCF is Maskin monotonic and satisfies no veto power. However, the canonical mechanism has been subject to a fair amount of criticism (see Jackson, 1992) , and thus we are led to the study of "nice" mechanisms. To obtain sorne intuition about what "nice" may mean in this context, we first study mechanisms used in real life, including the Borda count, the plurality rule, and others. We show that none of these mechanisms implements the SOCF in Nash equilibrium (most of them create equilibria yielding undesired outcomes). However, aH of these mechanisms use similar message spaces: Messages are rankings and/or real numbers that reflect these rankings. Since real numbers create a kind of integer game, given the latter's controversial nature (see Jackson, 1992) , we avoid real numbers.
We present two mechanisms in which the message space for each agent is the space of all possible rankings. The first mechanism implements the SOCF in Nash equilibrium when there are three agents (Theorem 2), the second implements this rule in Nash equilibrium when the number of agents is greater than three (Theorem 3). We do not know whether there is a 4There are many proofs of thc Gibbard-Satterthwaite thcorcm in a restrieted domain (see, e.g., Aswal and Sen 1997) . The main diffcrence between the doma in used in those proofs and our domain is that in our case, the set of admissible preferences profiles does not have a Cartesian product structure.
single "nice" mechanism implementing the SOCF for any number of agents. Since the number of agents involved in situations considered in this paper is public knowledge, we do not regard this as very important.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and Section 3 studies dominant strategies. Section 4 gathers our results on Nash implementation. Finally, Section 5 discusses possible extensions of our work.
THE MODEL
Let N be a set of n students applying for scholarships. A social alternative, 1T, is an assignment of scholarships to the students, i.e., a ranking (permutation) of the elements of N, so that the student in the first po sitio n gcts thc most prestigious scholarship, thc student in the second position gets the second most prestigious scholarship, and so on. Let TI be the set of assignments of scholarships (i.e., the set of all rankings of students in N).
For all 1T E TI and i E N, we denote by pr the position of student i in ranking 1T.
Each student, i E N, has a different adviser. The final assignment of scholarships will be decided by the group of students' advisers. In the sequel we will write agent i to denote both student i and his adviser. We as sume that there exists a true ranking of the students, 1T( E TI, known by all agents. The socially optimal alternative is that the scholarships should be assigned according to the true ranking. We assume, however, that the true ranking is not verifiable. Thus, to elicit the sociaHy optimal assignment of scholarships, we must rely on announcements madc by agents. This is the idea behind the concept of a mechanism. DEFINITION 1. A mechanism r is a tuple (S, g) , where S = XiENSi is a list of message spaces (one for each agent), and g : S ---+ TI is an outcome function.
A profile of messages is denotcd by s E S. For aH agents i E N and aH profilcs of mcssages s E S, let Si denote the message of agent i and S_i E S_i = X jEN\{i}Sj the messages of aH agents cxccpt i.
The description of preferences is slightly more complicated in our case than in the standard case. The complication arises because here, the prefcrence relation of each agent depends on the true ranking.
Let ~H denote the class of preference relations defined over TI satisfying reflexivity, transitivity, and completeness. Each agent i E N has a preference function 2:i: TI ---+ ~Jt, which associates with each true ranking,
1T( E TI, a preference relation 2:;' E m, where >-;' denotes the strict preference relation associated with 2:;' . For instance, let N = {a, b}. Then
We make two assumptions about the agents' preference functions. First, we as sume that agents are selfish in the sense that, when comparing two different assignments, each agent prefers the one in which he is in a better position, whatever the true ranking. Second, we also assume that, given a fixed position for an agent, the agent prefers the rest of the agents to be arranged as close as possible to the true ranking. Let N( 1T, ir) = {i E N: pr = PT}. In words, N( 1T, ir) is the set of agents who are in the same position in assignmcnts 1T and ir. DEFINITION 3. Agent i's preference function, ::::i: TI -f m, is unprejudiced with respcct to the other agents when, for all1T t E TI and al! 1T, ir E TI satisfying the following three conditions:
(2) iEN(1T,ir),and
We say that a preference function is moderately selfish when it is selfish and unprejudiced. The fol!owing examples may clarify this concept. Modcrate selfishness is asevere restriction on the domain of admissible preference functions. Actually, in the three-agents case there is a unique preference function for each agent that satisfies this condition. (a, e, b) , (b, a, e) , (b, e, a) , (e, a, b) , (e, b, an. So the only preference function of agent a satisfying moderate selfishness is the one defined in Table I . Here each column represents the (strict) preference relation associated with a different true ranking. ?:~a, e, lJ)
Let F ms denote the class of moderately selfish preference functions. A profile of preference functions is denoted by ~E F~s' A state of the world is a list of preference functions and a true ranking observed by aH agents, i.e., (~, 7T t ) E F~s x n. Let ~ms be the class of states of the world.
A profile of preference relations is admissible if there exists some state of the world k, 7T t ) E ~ms such that ~7Tt coincides with these preference relations. Let R be the set of admissible profiles of preference relations.
Given a state of the world and a mechanism, agents have to make decisions about the message to be sent. We foHow the standard procedure in implementation theory of capturing this decision by means of a gametheoretical equilibrium concept. Two examples of these concepts foHow. DEFINITION 4. Let r = (S, g) be a mechanism. We say that s E S is a dominant strategy equilibrium of r at state of the world k, 7T t ) E ~ms if
DEFINITION 5. Let r = (S, g) be a mechanism. We say that s E S is a Nash equilibrium of r at state of the world (~, 7T t ) 
Given a mechanism r and a state of the world (~, 7T t ) E ~ms' let D (I', ~7Tt) and N(r, ~7Tt) denote the sets of dominant strategy and Nash equilibria of r at (~, 7T t ), respectively.
Our objective in this paper is to implement the SOCF, <P : ~ms --+ n.
This function associates with each state of the world the assignment of scholarships corresponding to the true ranking for that state of the world, i.e., <p(~, 7T t ) = 7T t for aH (~, 7T t ) E ~ms' DEFINITION 6. A mechanism r = (S, g) implements the SOCF in dominant strategy equilibrium (resp., in Nash equilibrium) if for all k,
When n = 2, if preference functions are moderately selfish, then preference relations do not change with the true ranking. Therefore, the SOCF cannot be implemented in dominant strategies or in Nash equilibrium. 5 From now on, we assume that 11 :::: 3.
IMPLEMENTATION IN DOMINANT STRATEGIES
As we noted in the previous section, moderate selfishness is a serious restriction on the domain of admissible preference functions. Therefore, the domain of admissible preference relations is severely restricted as well. Notice that the set of admissible profiles of preference relations does not have a Cartesian product structure, since they are partIy determined by the true ranking (e.g., ?:!, d, ?:~E m, but (?:!, d, ?:~) ~ R). Therefore, the standard revelation principle cannot be applied here. 6 Suppose that there exists a mechanism r D(S, g) implementing <P in dominant strategies. Let s} E Si (s1 E Si) be a dominant strategy for agent SIn this case the SOCF cannot be implemented in any type of equilibrium. "The revelation principie states the following necessary condition for a choice function to be implementable in dominant stratcgies: In the manipulation game associated with the choice function, to announcc the true profilc of preference relations must be a dominant stratcgy equilibrium.
Playcr a (a,e,b) }; otherwisti, g(s~,s~,s¿) >-~c,a,bl g(5~, st" sD, which is a contradiction.
we have g(s!,s~,s~) 1' -{(b,a,e),(b,e,a)}; otherwise, g(s!,s~,sl) >-ha,b,c l g(s~, sh, sD, which is a contradiction. (1 2 1) (b, e, al we have g sa' Sh' se 1' -e, a, ,e" a ,otherwlse, g sa' sh' se >-c g(s!, s~, "'D, which is a contradiction.
Claims 1, 2, and 3 contradict the definition of an outcome function. _
IMPLEMENTATION IN NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The impossibility result shown earlier leads us to study the implementation of the SOCF in Nash equilibrium. A standard result in the theory of Nash implementation (see, e.g., Repullo, 1987) shows that, if there are threc or more agents, any choice function satisfying Maskin monotonicity7 and no veto power 8 is implementable in Nash equilibrium. It is easy to 7Roughly speaking, this conditioll says that if the choice fUlIction selccts sorne outcome for somc prcferenccs profile, thcn it must select thc same outcome if it becomcs more prcferred by all agcnts.
"No veto power mcans that when n :o: 3, if thcrc exists an outcomc which is the most preferrcd for at lcast n -1 agents, thcn it must be selectcd by the choice function. check that, under the moderate-selfishness assumption, the SOCF satisfies both conditions.
The canonical mechanism used in the proof of the result invoked aboye has been subject to a fair amount of criticism (see, e.g., Jackson, 1992) . Customary complaints include that the mcssage spaces are too complex and that rules of the game include integer games. Many researchers feel that when implementing a particular choice function, message spaces must be simple and the rules of the game must be as natural as possible. A difficulty with this argument is that in general, it is not easy to define what "simple" and "natural" mean. However, in our case, hints about what these properties mean may be found in the study of mechanisms used in the real world and the literature on voting. Therefore, we first review some of those mechanisms.
Borda Mechanism (f13)' This is the natural mechanism associated with the Borda rule. There is a common set of n! different scores. Agents identify each assignment in rr with one of these scores (with the restriction that each agent cannot give the same score to two different assignments). The assignment that receives the maximum score is chosen.
Modified Borda Meehanism (f MB)' In this variation of the Borda mechanism, there is a common set of n different scores. Agents identify each agent with one of these scores (with the restriction that each agent cannot give the same score to two different agents). The total score received by each agent determines the final assignment.
Plurality Meehanism (f p ). In this mechanism, each agent has to vote for one possible assignment. The assignment receiving the most number of votes is chosenY Seoring Meehanism (f se ). In this mechanism, each agent has to announce a score in a given interval for each agent, and agents are arranged according to the total scores received.
Modified Seoring Meehanism (f Mse). This is a variation of the scoring mechanism that tries to avoid the incentive that each agent has to give the maximum score to himself and the minimum score to other agents. Thus, the highest and the lowest scores received by the agent do not count.
Unfortunately, as we show in the following examples, all of these mechanisms may fail to implement the SOCF in Nash equilibrium. (a, e, b) , (b, a, e) , (b, e, a) , (e, a, b) , (e, b, an. Let f B = (S, g) "H is casy to see that undcr our assumptions, no Condorcct winner exists. AH of the foregoing mechanisms use similar message spaces that are rankings of students and/or real numbers. The rules of the game reftect the fact that the actual assignments provided by the mechanisms must be positively associated with the rankings provided by agents.
Next, we provide two mechanisms that implement the SOCF in Nash equilibrium. In both mechanisms the message spaces are sets of possible rankings of students. The first mechanism works for n = 3, and the second one works for n ~ 4. We do not know whether there is a single, natural mechanism for implementing the SOCF for aH n ~ 3.
In the mechanism for n = 3, each agent announces a position for the rest of the agcnts. The position of an agcnt i E N in the final assignment is the lowest number among the announcements of aH the other agents. In case of a tie between two agents, the relative ordering among the agents involved in the tie is decided by the agent not involved in the tie. If aH agents are tied, then an arbitrary assignment occurs.
Mechanism 1 (f,). Let n = 3. Let f] = (S, g) be as foHows. For aH i E N, Si = {(S;)jEN\{i} E {l, 2, 3}2: for aH j -::j=. k, s{ -::j=. s7}. We interpret s{ as the position that agent i announces for agent j. Let S = X iENS¡. For aH s E S, let S~in = minjEN\{i}{sj} (i.e., s~in is the best position for agent i announced by the other two agents). Let 'TT r E Il be an arbitrary assignment known by aH agents. The outcome function g : S ~ Il consists of the following three rules. For aH i, j, k E N,
As the foHowing theorem sta tes, Mechanism 1 implements the SOCF in Nash equilibrium when n = 3. We omit the proof of this result in the interests of brevity (the proof is obtainable by request). The intuition is that (1) truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium, and (2) if the assignment selected by the outcome function is not the corresponding to the true ranking, then there are two agents that are not arranged in accordance with the true ranking. In the latter case, the third agent can deviate and arrange them according to the truth, without changing his position.
Unfortunately, extension of Mechanism 1 to the case of more than three agents is not straightforward. The problem is to select the agent who breaks tieso We now present a mechanism for implementing the SOCF in Nash equilibrium when there are four or more agents. This mechanism sidesteps the previous difficulty at the cost of making the outcome function less transparent. In this mechanism only four agents are strategicaHy active. One of these (say agent d) states a relative order for the rest of agents, and the other three, saya, b, and e, determine the place of agent d. Sj' where med{·} denotes the median element of the corresponding set.
(1)
In Mechanism 2 we need only four agents whose preferences are moderately selfish, whatever the number of agents.
Mechanism 2 implements the SOCF in Nash equilibrium whcn n 2:: 4. The intuition behind the proof of this result is as foHows. On the one hand, agent d decides the relative order of the rest of the agents, and he cannot inftuence his own position. Since his preference function is moderately selfish, he has a strictIy dominant strategy-namely, to tell the truth. On the other hand, if the po sitio n of agent d is not the true one, then sorne agent has an incentive to deviate and to change the position of d.
The rule used to determine the final position of agent d is not very intuitive. Since agent d can be trusted to reveal truthfuHy the relative order of aH other agents, one might think that it should be easier to use the messages of the remaining agents to place agent d in the right position. The complexity of the former rule, however, arises from the need to rule out unwanted Nash equilibria. Proaf Let {a, b, e, d} <; N. Let f 2 = (S, g) be as defined aboye. Let ~= ka' ~b, ~C' ~d) E F~s and 7T( E 11. Suppose, without loss of generality,
Le., agent d cannot change his position given Ld)' Then, since ~dE F ms' agent d has a strictly dominant message, Sd E Sd' such that for all i, j E N\{d}, and Sk =1-n. We distinguish two cases.
Subcase 3.1.1. Suppose that P;' < P;'. We distinguish two possibilities: (3.1.1.1) Suppose that si < P;'. Then agent k prefers to deviate sending
(3.1.1.2) Suppose that P;' < si' If pr' -1 Si' then agent i prefers to deviate
Subcase 3.1.2. Suppose that P;' < P;'. We distinguish two possibilities: (3.1.2.1) Suppose that Si < P;'. Then agent k prefers to deviate sending
(3.1.2.2) Suppose that P;' :S Si' Then agent i or agent j (depending on whether or not pr' -1 Si) prefers to deviate in the sarne way as in (3.1.1.2).
FINAL REMARKS
In this paper we have studied a elass of problems in which a given society wants to elicit the truth from its agents. We have proved that obtaining the true ranking from dominant strategies is impossible and that implementation in Nash equilibrium can be done with simple mechanisms.
Relationship with the Literature. There are two papers related to ours: Balinski and S6nmez (1999) and Duggan and Martinelli (1998) . The paper by Balinski and S6nmez analyzes a elass of matching problems in which students are matched according to their preferences. A difference between our paper and the matching literature is that in the former professors have preferences over all student's scholarships, but in the latter each agent cares only about his own matching. In the paper by Balinski and S6nmez, students are assigned according to their preferences. In our paper, each professor wants his own student to get the most prestigious scholarship and the other students to be assigned according to the socially optimal outcome, so preferences alone cannot be decisive in assigning students.
The paper by Duggan and Martinelli analyzes voting by jury members. They analyze the Bayesian equilibrium of several voting rules in which the possible outcomes are to convict or not to convict. They show that the unanimity rule that is common to many judicial systems does not implement the optiinal conviction policy. There are several differences with our paper: In our case, preferences are restricted to be moderately selfish, whereas in their case, the allocation space ineludes only two alternatives (to convict or not to convict), but there are several voters. As a con sequen ce of these differences, the socially optimal choice correspondence is not implementable in our model in any equilibrium concept in the case of two agents (which corresponds to the case of two aIternatives in Duggan and Martinelli).
Extensions. We note sorne extensions of our work that might be fruitful.
1. Suppose that the true ranking is observed imperfectly by the agents. For instan ce, sorne agents may be more able than others to discern particular characteristics of the true ranking. This topic has been studied in psychology in the area of aggregation of expert's opinions (see Mongin, 1984 and references there in). The paper by Duggan and Martinelli analyzes a special case of this when there are only two alternatives. A recent entry in this are a is a paper by Krishna and Morgan (1999) .
2. Consider the following class of preferences. Each agent classifies all agents in three groups: friends, indifferent, and enemies. Each agent always prefers an alternative in which friends are higher in the ranking. Among those alternatives giving the same po sitio n to the group of friends, he prefers those in which enemies are worse off in the ranking. Finally, among all alternatives that are indifferent according to the aboye criteria, he prefers the alternative in which the indifferent agents are placed according to the true ranking. Moderately selfish preferences are a special case of this class where the group of friends includes only one agent and there are no enemies. We do not know the conditions on this class of preferences under which the SOCF is implementable.
3. Finally, in sorne problems the alternative is not a ranking, but rather a list of scores, one for each agent (i.e., gymnastics, skating, etc.).
We hope that further work will clarify the possibilities for implementing the socially optimal alternative (whatever it is) in the situations outlined aboye. We also hope that this work may be useful in designing mechanisms that can be applied to replace the existing ones.
